Evil in the Western Philosophical Tradition

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Gavin Rae

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Preface

This book aims to provide a conceptual history of the ways in which evil has been thought in the Western philosophical tradition. In so doing, it defends four different, but ultimately related, points: (1) while the conceptual problem of evil – how to reconcile the existence of evil with a God who is understood to be omnipotent, all-knowing, and supremely good – arose with and from the advent of Judaism and its movement to a monotheistic metaphysical system, it was with the rise of Christianity that it became *the* problem par excellence. Much ink was spilt trying to resolve this issue *within* an explicitly Christian framework, before Western thinking sought to abandon that framework for alternatives. Far from dissolving the problem of evil, these changes exacerbated it and, indeed, stimulated significant conceptual development, in relation to both the concept 'evil' and the metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological premises subtending it. (2) Contrary to popular belief, the meaning of evil is far from obvious or agreed upon; it is the almost complete lack of agreement about its meaning and what it refers to that is most striking, with this being because (3) each conception of evil is premised on different metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological assumptions. On first appearance, this might lead to the conclusion that Western philosophical thinking about evil is defined by a fundamental cleavage between pre- and post-Kantian thinking on the topic: the former basing itself explicitly on theological Christian doctrine which the latter abandoned. (4) I call into question any notion of a strict division between theologically (pre-Kantian) and secular (post-Kantian-)orientated analyses by showing that the latter often continue to employ theological language, concepts, motifs, or figures.

With this, the book contributes to the so-called theological (re)turn that has marked contemporary theory and specifically the line of critique that disrupts the notion that there exists a straightforward binary opposition

between the theological and secular. While it has increasingly abandoned any explicit link to Judaeo-Christian theology, Western thinking on evil continues to be shaped and framed, often in implicit and subtle ways, by the theological framework from which it originated as a conceptual problem.

These arguments will be more fully worked out in the text, but, at this stage, I am pleased to acknowledge that the book forms part of the activities for the Conex Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Project 'Sovereignty and Law: Between Ethics and Politics' (2013–00415–026), co-funded by the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the European Union's Seventh Framework Program for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration under Grant Agreement 600371, the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitivity (COFUND2013–40258), the Spanish Ministry for Education, Culture, and Sport (CEI-15-17), and Banco Santander. Information about the project can be found at https://sovereigntyandlaw.wordpress.com

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Introduction

While Western moral, philosophical, and theological thought has historically privileged the good,[1] this privileging has been accompanied by profound, if subterranean, interest in evil. In what follows, I set out to chart a history of evil as it has been thought within this tradition. A number of studies have recently traced different conceptions of evil from the eighteenth century onwards.[2] They re-enforce my point that 'evil' has been an important concept within Western philosophical thinking, but by confining themselves to the last three hundred or so years, they fail to appreciate that the problem of evil has a much longer history; one that goes back to the inter-Testament years. Indeed, the largely 'secular' approach to the problem of evil that has dominated since the eighteenth century is not only a reaction to the theological one that dominated prior to this period, but, as we will see, continues to be influenced, often in subtle ways, by it.

To understand Western thinking on 'evil' we need then to return to its theological origins, specifically the inter-Testament years (300 BC to AD 300) when developments within monotheistic thought created questions and problems that had not been troubling for the polytheism previously dominant until, with the rise of Christianity, evil became *the* problem to be accounted for and overcome. The purpose of this study is to trace how thinking on evil developed from this problematic, both within theologically inspired premises, and latterly within supposed 'secular' ones. Doing so will reveal the breadth and depth that have marked thinking about evil. Rather than being clear and obvious as common-sense, everyday intuition tends to hold, the meaning of evil has been remarkably contested. There has been complete lack of agreement about what evil entails, how to think about 'it', and what can be done, if anything, to avoid 'it'. While opponents of philosophy may point to this as proof of its inability to tackle 'real-world' issues, of which 'evil' might be considered one of the most pressing, the history of evil points to a different

conclusion: 'evil' is far from simplistic and obvious; 'it' is a remarkably complex concept that entails and depends upon the answers given to a range of metaphysical, epistemological, ontological, and normative questions.

The history of evil offered is *a* history, not *the* history. I do not claim that it is the only one available or even that it is the definitive version. The thinkers and approaches engaged with do, however, elucidate a fascinating and often ignored aspect of Western thought. My selections are guided by the contention that Western thinking has been marked by a number of fundamental changes that delineate various crossroads leading in several directions. In charting this history, the aim is not to argue for one position over others, but to identify major milestones that have constituted Western thinking on the topic. I focus on those that have either significantly developed already existing conceptual frameworks or decisively broken with previous ones to offer alternatives. This is bound to entail a somewhat controversial selection. Not only have some thinkers been omitted who rightly have a justifiable claim to be included, but limiting the analysis of each thinker to a single chapter risks provoking the ire of specialists who would like a fuller treatment. The need to balance breadth and depth is, of course, a problem that accompanies every attempt to offer a history of a topic. Other figures could have been incorporated, but I think those chosen are relatively uncontroversial and capture the major trajectories that define Western thought on the topic.

Importantly, I note that this history appears to be marked by one fundamental division above all others: that between theologically orientated approaches that explicitly ground the problem of evil in Judaeo-Christian doctrine, and secular or post-Christian efforts that account for evil without explicitly grounding their explanations in the Judaeo-Christian tradition; indeed, they more often than not explicitly distance themselves from that tradition. The key figure for this argument is Kant: pre-Kantian thinkers tend to adopt the theological approach, while post-Kantian ones are prone to affirm the secular or post-Christian one. Such a division supports the conclusion that Western thinking generally and on evil specifically has undergone a historical process of secularisation.

The literature on secularisation is enormous, but, in one of the most sophisticated recent analysis of the topic, Steve Bruce remarks that 'the secularisation paradigm aims to explain one of the greatest changes in social structure and culture: the displacement of religion from the centre of human life'.[3] On this understanding, it describes

> the decay of religious institutions; the displacement, in matters of behaviour, of religious rules and principles by demands that accord with strictly

> technical criteria; the sequestration by political powers of the property and facilities of religious agencies; the replacement of a specifically religious consciousness (which might range from dependence on charms, rites, spells, or prayers, to a broadly spiritually inspired ethical concern) by an empirical, rational, instrumental orientation; the shift from religious to secular control of a variety of social activities and functions; the decline in the proportion of their time, energy, and resources that people devote to supernatural concerns.[4]

Bruce's analysis is a sociological one and so combines two methodologies: a historical investigation that he takes to show that 'the peoples of pre-industrial Europe were deeply religious'[5] and an empirical inquiry rooted in statistical reporting. To undertake the latter, he focuses on 'demand for religion'[6] as a proxy for religious belief, claims that church attendance reveals levels of religious belief, and, by citing reports that show that religious attendance has decreased rapidly across Western Europe,[7] concludes that this reveals that a process of secularisation has taken and is taking place. While noting that this process could be altered, he thinks it highly unlikely, with the consequence that 'secularisation must be seen as irreversible'.[8]

This, however, can take stronger or weaker versions: in the former, this process eventually leads to a completely secular culture with no religious element; in the latter, it entails the decay of religiosity without completely abolishing it. Bruce seems to vacillate on this issue: in his description of secularisation, he talks of the decay, displacement, and transference of religious to secular sentiment, thereby appearing to affirm the weaker version. However, at other times, he makes statements that seem to confirm the stronger claim; for example, that 'it is reasonable to assume that the trend we have seen for a century will continue',[9] which can only mean that the declining trend will eventually hit zero religiosity or full secularity. This vacillation brings to the fore the question: does secularisation describe a process whereby theological-religious motifs are displaced from their previously dominant and foundational role but continue to be expressed in society, or does it entail a process whereby theological-religious motifs are gradually completely eliminated from society?

This book defends the former by showing that supposedly secular analyses of evil often continue to depend upon theological motifs, concepts, figures, or ideas. Despite what many of the authors examined explicitly claim, their great theological refusal continues to *implicitly* make use of or point to that which it rejects. In so doing, this book contributes to the (re)turn to theology that has marked recent critical theory.[10] While various commentators have

undertaken analyses of Western thinking's conception of modernity,[11] epistemology,[12] social imaginaries,[13] political theology,[14] and phenomenological philosophy,[15] to disrupt any straightforward binary opposition between the theological and secular or linear movement from the former to the latter, I complement and extend this line of critique by examining this issue through the lens of philosophical studies of *evil*, one of the key moral concepts in Western thought. To reiterate, the claim is not that secular analyses of evil are actually theological in disguise or that they are determined by their theological heritage; it is that their explicit rejection of theology continues to implicitly and often quite subtly make use of the language, logic, figures, and motifs of the paradigm that they reject.

To give one example of what this might look like, Bruce claims that through secularisation, 'evil and sin have been turned into alienation and unhappiness'.[16] This, however, ignores the fact that 'alienation' is an inherently theological concept, first being used to describe the evil that arose from separation from God.[17] Even if the way in which alienation is understood to occur is not grounded explicitly in a relationship to God, to describe evil as entailing any form of alienation is to continue to implicitly depend upon a theological language, motif, relation, and concept. We cannot then simply think in terms of a binary opposition between explicitly theological and secular analyses; the movement to the latter does not simply replace the former. The secular continues to *implicitly* depend upon the theological narrative and so is engaged in a far more entwined, tangled, difficult, and complex conceptual relationship to that which it originated from and often explicitly rejects.

Structure of the Book

Part I looks to the origins that brought forth the *conceptual* problem of evil, showing that it arose with the rise of monotheism, before outlining the main ways in which this tradition, specifically its Christian trajectory, has dealt with it. To this end, Chapter 1 identifies that, while polytheistic metaphysical systems could account for evil relatively easily – by locating evil across numerous Gods or in one opposed to a good deity – the rise of monotheism altered the parameters of the debate and meant that evil had to be accounted for within the constraints of a singular deity who was held to be responsible for all.

Initially, monotheistic thought insisted that God was a complex of opposites, meaning that He was both good and evil. Any evil that existed was a consequence of God's wrath, done in His name by figures sent by Him.

The figure of *the satan* in the Book of Job is the most obvious and famous example of this. Gradually, however, the tensions resulting from this understanding in combination with splits within the nascent Hebrew community led to conceptual alterations in the understanding of God that contributed to the development of an implicit dualism within monotheism. As a consequence of the movement from the Old to New Testaments and Judaism to Christianity, God was no longer understood to be a complex of opposites, but was associated with supreme goodness. Evil, in contrast, was located in another cosmic figure and realm: *Satan* and Hell.

While this saved God's goodness, it did so by appearing to undermine His power. After all, if God was all-powerful, why did He not simply annihilate Satan and, by extension, evil? That He did not appeared to indicate that He either sanctioned Satan's and evil's continued existence or was powerless to stop them. This was obviously troubling. Indeed, it threatened the monotheistic principles upon which Judaic-Christian thinking is based. The easiest solution was to adopt a straightforward dualism, a position most explicitly seen with the rise of Manichaeism in the third century. While highly seductive, the challenge brought forth by Manichaeism galvanised Christian thinkers to offer a response, one that would account for the existence of evil within monotheistic parameters. Initially, this led to the study of Scripture, but when that was found to give multiple and sometimes contradictory responses, Christian thinkers realised that *they* would have to develop the conceptual resources to reconcile God's omnipotent, all-knowing, supreme goodness with the undoubted existence of evil.

The challenge was most brilliantly taken up in the late fourth and early fifth centuries by Augustine (Chapter 2), who based his account on three questions: what is evil? Who is responsible for evil? And why does not God prevent individuals from committing evil? First establishing that God creates *ex nihilo*, Augustine links God to the good and the good to being to conclude that what God creates has being which, because it emanates from Him, is good. Because evil is the opposite of good, it must lack being. Crucially, Augustine distinguishes between *privation*, entailing a lack of that which an entity should have based on its universal form, and *negation*, describing the differences and hence natural inequalities that exist between beings, to conclude that evil is a privation not a negation. As a privation, evil does not have substantial being and could not have been created by God. This, however, brings forth the question of who is responsible for evil.

Augustine responds by distinguishing between evils suffered (*malum poenae*), which will come to be known as 'natural evils', and evils committed (*malum culpae*), which will become 'moral evils'. To account for the

latter, Augustine develops the free-will argument: God provides humans with the capacity of free choice, which they can use to affirm His goodness or turn away from Him towards their own particular, bodily desires. Moral evil results from the latter. Natural evils are committed by God to punish moral evils. The important point about natural evils is that they aim to correct individual behaviour so that it accords with the right path of God. With this, Augustine appears to account for the existence of evil, exculpate God from responsibility for it, and secure His goodness. This 'solution' did, however, lead to the third question: why does not God prevent individuals from committing evil? Augustine's responds by pointing to an underdeveloped theodicy wherein any evils that are committed and suffered ultimately contribute to the good.

While Augustine's account reinvigorated Christian thinking, it was suggestive rather than fully thought out and called for revision and extension. As Christianity cemented its dominance throughout Western Europe, it came into contact with alternative doctrines. This interaction stimulated intense debate within Christianity, which led to substantial doctrinal changes, and, ultimately, confusion over what was official doctrine regarding evil.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (Chapter 3) responded by both systematising and developing Church dogma. Incorporating Aristotelian insights that had come to Christianity from its interaction with Islam, Aquinas took over the free-will and privation arguments outlined by Augustine and made them more conceptually nuanced and logically rigorous. His real innovation, however, was to account for the problematic doctrine of Original Sin – the notion that since the Fall of Man in the Garden of Eden, human ontology has been marked by sin – by turning to a naturalist explanation whereby the evil of Original Sin is understood to reside in semen that is passed on through the procreative act. With his incorporation of the naturalist perspective, Aquinas not only substantially developed Christian doctrine, but also laid the foundations for the incorporation of naturalist premises that marked subsequent Western thought as we move from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries.

This transitional period of around four hundred years was dominated by two trends, both of which would noticeably alter thinking on evil. The Christian Church became increasingly concerned about the impact that the figure of Satan was having on Western civilisation. This led to demonologies and greater attention being paid than ever before to the role that Satan was playing in the world, concern that was most infamously manifested through the Spanish Inquisition.[18] This was accompanied and, to a degree, undermined by a gradual epistemological shift away from conclusions based

on theological speculation and Scripture to those that could be justified through rational analysis grounded in naturalist premises. Rather than looking to God or the Heavens for answers, reason and the natural realm became the foundations of thought.

A key milestone in this process was René Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*[19] (Chapter 4), which aimed to demonstrate, through sceptical, rational analysis, the existence of an omnipotent, all-knowing, supremely good God. In so doing, Descartes linked evil to human error to undermine the Christian notion that evil was an effect of a malevolent cosmic being. In contrast, Descartes held that evil emanates from the improper use of human cognition; namely when the infinite will oversteps the finite knowledge that properly belongs to human judgement. Because the latter is given by God, departing from it is to depart from God, which re-enforces one of the central meanings that evil had for the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Descartes's account of evil is important because he links it to epistemological questions, while his focus on the relationship between human will and evil develops the Augustinian approach in a way that lays the groundwork for Kant's thinking on the topic. Descartes's conception of God was, however, subject to sustained attack. The insistence that God creates according to His will seemed to make His actions arbitrary. By affirming God's power, manifested through His unconstrained will, Descartes appeared to call into question His goodness. It is perhaps not surprising that this led to a counter-proposal, most famously defended by Gottfried Leibniz, that privileged God's goodness, expressed in His perfect knowledge, over His power.

Chapter 5 shows that Leibniz agreed with Descartes that God's creation is linked to His will, but claimed that His will is an effect of His knowledge. This is not arbitrary, which would call into question the notion of 'truth', but is based on the Idea that defines the unchanging essence of each thing. God must, then, create in accordance with the Idea of each particular thing, meaning that there is determinacy to His actions. God is further constrained in what He can create by virtue of His goodness: He must create the best of all possible worlds. Because of this, we can be assured that the world we live in, including all the evil in it, is the best that could have been made.

Leibniz supports this through the introduction of a number of conceptual innovations, namely the distinction between natural, moral, and metaphysical evils and that between God's antecedent and consequential wills. With this, he develops Augustine's privation account of evil by claiming that evil does not have real being but only exists from the limited and flawed perspective of human being. What humans consider to be an evil is, as a

consequence of God's supreme goodness and perfection, the least amount of evil required for God to create the best of all possible worlds.

The basic upshot of Leibniz's conclusion is that evil is nothing to worry about; it ultimately contributes to the greatest good. This was meant to be comforting: God is with us throughout all the trials and tribulations suffered. However, informing everyone who suffers an evil that it is nothing to worry about or is needed for the greater good was always going to elicit a reaction. It is perhaps not surprising that Leibniz's theodicy was almost immediately subject to remorseless critique, most famously captured in Voltaire's *Candide*.[20] It is, however, crucial to historical studies of evil because it lies on an important crossroads entailing something of a culmination for thinking about evil from strictly theological premises and being the impetus that brought forth secular accounts.

To outline these, Part II moves beyond theologically inspired analyses of evil to those that marked the hundred years or so from the end of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, specifically Kant's *Religion without the Boundaries of Mere Reason*,[21] published in 1793; Schelling's *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*,[22] published in 1809; and Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*,[23] published in 1887. This period was marked by increasingly radical critiques of the metaphysics underpinning Christian thinking and, by extension, its understanding of evil.

Chapter 6 examines Kant's attempt to understand evil within the boundaries of autonomous reason. Rejecting Leibnizian-inspired theodicies because of their unjustified metaphysical assumptions, Kant follows the parameters established by his critique of pure reason to limit the application of human knowledge to the phenomenal realm. Evil cannot be understood through reference to God, but only by reference to that which is phenomenally experienced; a methodological innovation that brought Kant to focus on the actions of individuals. Rejecting the long-standing concept of 'natural evil' and the notion of 'diabolical evil', often associated with the figure of Satan, Kant focuses on 'moral evil' and accounts for it by examining the structure of individual morality, claiming that it is grounded in a freely chosen moral maxim.

With this, he subtly rethinks Augustine's notion of will to suggest that evil results from the wilful adoption of a moral maxim that is not guided by the moral law. Evil is, as a consequence, radical in the sense pointed to by its Latin etymological origin *radix*, meaning 'root' or 'base.' However, that evil is a consequence of an act of noumenal freedom means that an individual can always change his moral maxim and so stop being evil, although Kant

recognises that, because it is a noumenal choice, an individual's reasons for doing so are beyond the scope of phenomenal knowledge: accounting for such a change would require a purely theoretical account of practical activity, which is precisely what is rejected by the noumenal/phenomenal distinction introduced by his critical philosophy.

Chapter 7 examines a long-neglected response to Kant: Schelling's 1809 essay *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*. Schelling is an important milestone in the history of evil because he argues that Kant was mistaken to reject metaphysical speculation – indeed, he argued that Kant's critical philosophy depended upon it – before developing a post-Kantian metaphysical explanation for evil. Whereas Kant was happy to accept that his critical philosophy fell into a number of antinomies, Schelling objects that this was because Kant failed to recognise that they were effects of a metaphysical whole termed the Absolute. Importantly, the Absolute, otherwise called God, is not an undifferentiated totality, but differentiated and self-differentiating: God creates Himself through an autopoietic action whereby His dark abyssal ground finds expression in the light of existent beings. This dark metaphysical abyss is the source of the possibility of evil in actual existence. Schelling terms it 'general evil' and claims that it is manifested in and through the 'particular evils' of individuals. With this, he rejects not only the Augustinian notion that evil entails the privation of being, to explain that evil has real positive being, but also Kant's claim – itself tied to the Augustinian affirmation of individual will – that evil is located in the noumenal choice of *individuals*. Instead, Schelling insists that evil has real being and is a possibility grounded in the structure of *existence*.

Schelling goes on to claim that this metaphysical schema, in which a dark abyss finds expression in the light of existent beings, is mirrored in the structure of the human psyche: a dark unconscious grounds reflective consciousness. Rather than a noumenal/phenomenal division, Schelling proposes an unconscious/conscious one: evil is understood to result when an individual unconsciously chooses to affirm the dark principle of abyssal chaos over the light of God. Whereas Kant holds that this choice could be reversed, Schelling rejects this possibility: once an individual has unconsciously chosen, he cannot subsequently alter his moral choice. Not only is evil located in the depths of existence, but, if chosen, it cannot be overcome.

This conclusion stands out in the history of philosophy: it not only criticises the Judaeo-Christian conception of evil, to develop another rooted in an alternative conception of God, but is the only account that does not offer the individual the possibility of overcoming evil. When this is combined with his insistence that evil exists as a latent possibility in the structure of

reality, we see that Schelling's conception of evil is one of the darkest and most imposing ever thought.

History was not, however, kind to Schelling: his thought, including his account of evil, was almost immediately forgotten, eclipsed by his one-time room-mate Georg Hegel.[24] Hegel produced an interesting account of evil which, very crudely put, synthesises a secular version of Leibniz's theodicy with Kant's autonomous reason read through the lens of history. Rather than hold that the world as it is now is the best of all possible ones, Hegel concluded that a historical process was under way that held out the possibility of eventually realising a fully rational world.[25] The importance that Hegel attributed to historical alteration was crucial for subsequent thought, which would find it increasingly difficult to hold that the meaning of concepts was ahistoric. As such, the nature of 'evil' had to be rethought from a thoroughly historical perspective. The most radical proponent of this was Friedrich Nietzsche (Chapter 8).[26]

Nietzsche is an important figure in studies of evil because he does not accept that 'evil' has always existed or is defined by a universal, ahistoric meaning. 'Evil' is born of a particular worldview and semiotic system, with the consequence that its meaning depends upon changing, heterogeneous, power relations manifested through pre-personal, socio-historical interactions and relations. For Nietzsche, moral categories are grounded not in theological sources or autonomous reason, but in dynamic, naturalist, socio-historic power structures and processes.

Employing a genealogical methodology that distinguishes between 'master' and 'slave' forms of morality, Nietzsche shows how the former, defined by a good/bad distinction, initially reigned before being overthrown by the latter's good/evil opposition. Associating the latter schema with the Judaic-Christian tradition, he implicitly points out that any discussion of evil remains tied to that tradition. With this, he introduces two particular innovations to analyses of evil: first, he utilises an original methodology to return to the origins of the logic that underpins Western morality to argue that it results from the socio-historical situation of different groups. This allows him to tie the meaning of evil to concrete social relations manifested through different power relations. Second, he suggests that not only do moral concepts change meaning based on alterations to the power relations subtending them, but, far more radically, not all power relations need to employ the concept 'evil'. Contrary to what Christian theology tells us, 'evil' is not an objective, ahistoric moral category, but one born of a particular theological worldview and semiotic system that always remains tied to that theological origin.

Part III moves from the nineteenth to the twentieth century to show that Schelling's focus on subterranean unconscious processes in combination with the socio-historical methodology employed by Nietzsche continued to shape much thinking on evil. Rather than try to identify the nature of evil, what reality must be like to permit evil, or the historical processes that gave rise to the moral category 'evil', there was a gradual shift towards emphasising the social processes that bring individuals to commit evil and the semantic structures that give rise to the notion 'evil'.

Chapter 9 shows how the former is manifested through Hannah Arendt's analysis of the concept. While she initially relied upon a Kantian-inspired radical conception of evil, her experiences of the Holocaust brought her to abandon it for a banal one. To outline the main contours of Arendt's analyses of evil, I pay particular attention to the problems that she claims the Kantian notion of radical evil suffers from as a result of the rise of totalitarian regimes, before showing that the key features of banal evil are the existence of social-political regimes that foster a moral attitude in individuals whereby they (1) fail to examine an issue from the perspective of another and, linked to this, (2) lack the capacity for substantive thinking about moral ends. Arendt's importance for studies of evil emanates from her rejection of the foundational logic underpinning Kant's conception of radical evil and her claim that, while individual choice remains a crucial component of evil (which binds her to the Augustinian tradition), (banal) evil is fundamentally socio-political in nature.

The emphasis Arendt placed on the subterranean social structures and processes shaping thought was complemented by the rise of structuralism in the 1950s and its focus on unconscious, concealed, and implicit *linguistic structures* that, far from being ahistoric, are diachronically relational. That meaning is generated from relations meant that each aspect of the relation is as important as the other. What had previously been overlooked or downgraded to a secondary phenomenon was, all of a sudden, elevated to an equal footing with that which had previously dominated it. Initially, this found expression in the fields of anthropology and psychoanalysis: the former sought to understand cultures through the structural relations of their symbolic codes, while the latter's notion of the unconscious was particularly important in showing that these structures operate at a 'hidden', implicit level of human organisation.

Chapter 10 outlines Jacques Lacan's account of how meaning is generated from a pre-personal symbolic order, before, briefly, developing what a Lacanian theory of evil might entail by reading it through the symbolic–real relation. This explains how the meaning of evil is generated, demonstrates

its instability, and complements Nietzsche's critique of the notion that 'evil' has a unitary, ahistoric meaning. However, whereas Nietzsche argues that this is because of the changing dynamic of historical group formations, Lacan claims that it is a result of the differential symbolic relations that give rise to meaning. This, in turn, has consequences for belief in God and the meaning of evil.

For Lacan, atheism does not entail a radical rupture with theology, but continues to unconsciously believe in God or an ordering principle that fulfils the same role as the signifier 'God' previously did, while 'evil' is understood to be the signifier that aims, but, due to the nature of the Lacanian real – which points to that which escapes symbolic meaning – always fails, to designate the non-signifiable real *within* the symbolic order. Explanations of evil are therefore palliatives designed to incorporate the unknowable real into the knowable symbolic register. Doing so sanitises the unknowable and makes the individual feel safe and secure in the face of 'it'. Responding to 'evil' requires a psychoanalytic reaction, not a philo-theosophical one, to understand why the individual has created that particular conception of evil, as a precursor to bringing the individual to better understand how he faces the real.

Lacan's thought was both influential and highly controversial. One of the most polemic critiques came from Cornelius Castoriadis (Chapter 11), who argues that because Lacan claims that meaning emanates from the closed binarity inherent in symbolic relations, he is unable to account for originality, upon which Lacan's creation of the three registers depends. Castoriadis charges then that Lacan's thought is both internally inconsistent and, by trapping thought within the confines of a closed, totalised system, unable to offer any radical political prescriptions to break repressive structures. By claiming that the imaginary entails the imposition of an illusionary order on a chaotic, differentiating world, Lacan, on Castoriadis's telling, associates the imaginary with repression and illusion, not creativity and expression.

In contrast, Castoriadis argues that the 'motor' of Lacan's system and, indeed, of meaning in general is the imaginary, which Castoriadis associates with radical, disjunctive creativity. Terming this the 'radical imaginary', and subsequently dividing it between individual and social aspects, he argues that it is only when the imaginary is given pre-eminence as the creative 'force' of existence that we can properly understand the nature of radical innovation and creativity and, in so doing, account for the originality inherent in Lacan's system.

Castoriadis does, however, agree with Lacan that thought cannot simply proceed on the assumption that a concept's meaning is clear or uncon-

tested. If we are to understand what 'evil' means, we must understand how meaning is attributed to it. Castoriadis departs from Lacan in claiming that this occurs not through anonymous, differential, linguistic, symbolic relations, but through the anonymous, collective, social-historical imaginary of each society. Explaining how meaning is created allows us to determine the framework that generates conceptual meaning, which can then be used to outline whether a particular act can be properly described by that concept.

Castoriadis focuses on the first part of this tripartite schema (how meaning is created) and has very little to say on the subsequent parts. This is not due to a failing on his part, but results from the nature of his ontogenetic account of meaning: given that moral meaning is an effect of an anonymous social imaginary, it will be different for each society, with the consequence that we cannot treat it as if it had universal, ahistorical significance. By claiming that meaning is a consequence of the anonymous actions of the social collective, Castoriadis radicalises Arendt's claim regarding the importance that social and political structures have in shaping individual life.

The great problem with Castoriadis's position, however, is that it appears to make it extremely difficult if not impossible to hold socialised individuals responsible for 'their' actions. Strictly speaking, 'their' actions are not 'theirs;' they are effects of the social imaginary. Despite affirming the moral and political significance of individual autonomy, thereby tying himself to the Kantian and Augustinian traditions, Castoriadis's approach was criticised for being incapable of holding individuals responsible for their actions. It was, therefore, unable to resolve practical issues relating to how to deal with the perpetrators or victims of evil. To correct this, thinking on evil turned away from the question of how meaning is constructed, to examine the topic from the perspectives of the agents involved.

Part IV shows that late twentieth-century thought, manifested through John Kekes's *Facing Evil*[27] (published in 1990), and early twenty-first-century thinking, specifically Claudia Card's *The Atrocity Paradigm* (published in 2002) and *Confronting Evils* (published in 2010),[28] sought to resolve this dilemma by ignoring the question of how meaning is generated, to simply adopt an axiomatic definition of 'evil' to examine the harm caused by an agent's actions from the perspectives of those involved. This gave rise to what have become known as perpetrator-based and victim-based accounts of evil.

Chapter 12 outlines John Kekes's attempt to develop the former by distinguishing between the historically dominant 'choice-morality', which argues that an agent's actions alone are subject to moral judgement, and 'character-morality', which holds that an agent's act, developed through habits

learnt from the encounter with others, reveals not just its moral worth but also the moral worth of the perpetrator's character. Thus, moral choices are grounded in individual habits, rather than autonomously chosen actions, and are therefore socially acquired.

While this breaks with the Augustinian claim that evil results from free will, Kekes quickly reaffirms it by claiming that individuals can break from environments that habitually condition evil actions if they so choose. With this, he reaffirms Arendt's argument that, while social norms condition individual action, they do not determine it. Individual moral action may be habitually learnt, but it is ultimately a consequence of individual, wilful choice; a position that, despite his best efforts, demonstrates his continued dependence on the Augustinian theological tradition.

Kekes uses a perpetrator's actions to understand his moral character and, in so doing, brings questions of moral psychology into analyses of evil. This does, however, raise the following question: if evil entails causing or suffering undeserved harm, should we not focus on the victims of that action? After all, Kekes can only make judgements about the moral worth of a perpetrator by first identifying a victim who has suffered undeserved harm. For this reason, Claudia Card (Chapter 13) rejects Kekes's perpetrator-based approach to suggest that we must never forget, and, indeed, can only ever understand evil by focusing on, its victims. In contrast to Kekes's insistence that evil entails undeserved harm, Card insists that evils are reasonably foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by inexcusable wrongs. From this starting point, she distinguishes evil from lesser wrongs, while also pointing out that there are degrees of evils. Emphasising this gradation allows her to define what counts as an evil while also expanding the examples that are called evil.

This is important because she does not want to limit 'evil' to the monstrous actions typically identified with 'evil', but claims that it also incorporates often-ignored evils such as rape, domestic or gender violence, and the torture of animals. In so doing, she combats three historical myths about evil: evil-doers are monstrous; there is a cosmic battle between good and evil; and there is a metaphysical force that controls individual actions. This not only rejects the Christian narrative on evil, but also questions the simplistic binary logic (good versus evil) that underpins it.

For Card, agents are not merely faced with a binary opposition of good and evil. Morality is far more complex than this logic implies. Conceptually speaking, good and evil are distinct, evil is distinguished from lesser wrongs, and all are defined by degrees, while Card maintains that, experientially, agents often find themselves in situations that require actions that are not

clearly good or evil. She develops this through Primo Levi's notion of 'grey zones', which entail the creation of extremely stressful spaces or relationships wherein victims become perpetrators of evil against other victims. This brings her analysis into the socio-political realm, and so is reminiscent of Arendt's approach, while, by linking grey zones to diabolical evil, also distinguishing her position from Kant's rejection of the latter form of evil: there is, on Card's telling, an absolute, diabolical form of evil entailing evil done for its own sake. In positing this notion, she returns us to an absolute conception of evil that had long been downplayed by secular theories of evil. Indeed, by developing her notion of diabolical evil from the Biblical figure of Satan, her 'secular' theory of evil returns, however ephemerally, to the figure and conception of evil inherent in Christian thinking on the topic.

While this reveals that Card's thinking on evil is not as secular as she insists it is, the conclusion notes that it is simply the latest manifestation of a trend that has marked Western so-called 'secular' thinking on evil. From the continuing emphasis on a radicalised conception of Augustinian will (Arendt, Castoriadis, Kant, and Kekes), Schelling's rejection of Judaeo-Christian conceptions of God to develop a radical conception of evil rooted in a different conception of God, Nietzsche's claim that 'evil' is an inherently Judaeo-Christian concept, Kekes's and Card's use of the foundational logic grounding the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and Card's use of the figure of Satan and absolute evil, we see that despite its long history of conceptual innovation and its supposed increasing turn towards secularity, a trace of the theological narrative on evil, and, in particular the logic and figures underpinning the Christian account of it, continues to find expression in Western philosophical thinking on the topic.

Notes

1. Plato, *Republic*, trans. G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve, 508e–509a, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), pp. 971–1223.
2. Richard Bernstein, *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Peter Dews, *The Idea of Evil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
3. Steve Bruce, *Secularisation: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 1.
4. Ibid. p. 2.
5. Ibid. p. 5.
6. Ibid. p. 3.

7. To give one example, Bruce quotes a Mannheim Eurobarometer survey showing that the percentage of the population attending church once a week or more often changed dramatically between 1970 and 1999: in France from 23 to 5 per cent; in Belgium from 52 to 10 per cent; in Holland from 41 to 14 per cent; in Germany from 29 to 15 per cent; in Italy from 56 to 39 per cent; and in Ireland from 91 to 65 per cent (ibid. p. 10).
8. Ibid. p. 56.
9. Ibid. p. 23.
10. For a discussion of this, see Gregg Lambert, *Return Statements: The Return of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
11. See Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Jason A. Josephson-Storm, *The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
12. Dominic Erdozain, *The Soul of Doubt: The Religious Roots of Unbelief from Luther to Marx* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
13. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
14. Clayton Crockett, *Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics after Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Jeffrey W. Robbins, *Radical Democracy and Political Theology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Simon Critchley, *The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology* (London: Verso, 2012).
15. Hent de Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
16. Bruce, *Secularisation*, p. 13.
17. For a discussion of the history of the concept of alienation, including its theological roots, see Gavin Rae, 'Alienation, Authenticity, and the Self', *History of the Human Sciences*, 23:4, 2010, pp. 21–36.
18. Two excellent studies of which are Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision*, 4th edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); and Joseph Perez, *Brève Histoire de L'Inquisition en Espagne* (Paris: Faynard, 2002).
19. René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. and ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
20. Voltaire, *Candide* (Paris: Magnard, 2013).
21. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
22. F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
23. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufman and

R. J. Hollingdale, in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1989), pp. 15–198.

24. It was only with Martin Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on the 1809 freedom essay that Schelling started to once again be taken seriously philosophically. See Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).
25. For far less crude explanations of Hegel's conception of evil, see Michael Theunissen, *Hegels Lehre vom absolutem Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), pp. 266–74; and Timothy Brownlee, 'Hegel's Moral Concept of Evil', *Dialogues: Canadian Philosophical Review*, 52:1, 2013, pp. 81–108.
26. For discussions of the relationship between Hegel and Nietzsche, see Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Will Dudley, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
27. John Kekes, *Facing Evil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
28. Claudia Card, *The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Claudia Card, *Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

1

The Rise of the Problem of Evil

The problem of evil, as a *conceptual problem* – that is, as a problem to be dealt with through rational means – came to the fore with the rise of monotheism.[1] It is, therefore, intimately connected to the Judaeo-Christian tradition.[2] This is not to say that polytheistic systems did not have conceptions of evil, only that, conceptually speaking, polytheism can deal with the problem of evil relatively easily: a 'good' god can be simply opposed to an 'evil' one.

With monotheism, however, the problem of evil is far more complex because, as the source of all, God must be the source of both good and evil. This gives rise to the question of how God can be good and evil, an issue compounded once it is accepted that God is all-powerful and supremely good: If His omnipotence is privileged, it would appear that God is capable of simply annihilating the evil principle. If His goodness is privileged, then He is simply incapable of committing evil acts. Why then does evil continue to exist?

One way to resolve this would be to accept that evil has an alternative source to God, but this seems, at best, to call into question God's all-powerfulness, and, at worst, threatens polytheism. On the contrary, if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and supremely good, how or why does He permit evil to exist? And where does it come from? These were some of the questions that occupied the inter-Testament years (350 BC to AD 300). During this time, tremendous debates took place regarding the nature of evil, its relationship to God, and the figure(s) associated with it.

Generally speaking, Judaic thought accounts for the existence of evil by clinging to a strict monotheism whereby God lies at the source of all. Because God is everything, He is light and dark, good and evil, this and that, and so on; He is, in other words, a complex of opposites. Due to the precarious historical situation of the Hebrewic[3] community and conceptual problems associated with thinking of God in terms of a complex of opposites, God became associated solely with good, while evil was located in

an alternative source. With this, the strict monotheism of Judaism gradually gave way to an *implicit* dualism, manifested in the Christian division between God and Satan, whereby evil was expelled from God to find expression 'in' another, inferior being that exists in confrontational opposition to God. However, by appearing to call into question its monotheistic principles, this splitting has ensured that the questions of the nature and figure of evil have been particularly troubling issues for Christianity. Indeed, on one reading, the problem of evil is *the* problem of Christianity.

The subject of evil in the Judaeo-Christian tradition is then intimately bound up with God's relationship to another figure that comes to be called Satan.[4] Initially, evil was not associated with a figure who personified evil; it only comes to be so in the New Testament. This understanding had to be created, and was so over many centuries, in response to alterations in the meaning and place of this figure in relation to God, the relationship God was thought to have with 'evil', and, indeed, the metaphysical structure underpinning the Judaeo-Christian framework. The overview[5] provided in this chapter will not engage in the deep-seated theological debates of these traditions, nor will it argue for one conception over the other. It will simply aim to identify a number of the major structural alterations that took place as Judaic thinking gave rise to Christianity. By charting the different ways that the figure who will come to be known as Satan was transformed through the movement from the Old Testament to the New Testament, we will better understand how the problem of evil arose, which, in turn, will reveal how it was thought historically, and, indeed, the parameters through which those thinkers who defend the theological narrative of evil will develop their responses.

Monotheism and the Problem of Evil

The notion of evil has its origins in ancient mythology, but the first conceptualisation of it, including the first *philosophical* engagement with the problem, had to await the rise of philosophy in Ancient Greece.[6] While mythology was a crucial aspect of Greek thinking, the Greeks were the first to recognise that the existence of evil was a question that needed to be asked conceptually. The problem that comes to occupy so much of subsequent thought was anticipated by Epicurus (341–270 BC), who famously summarised it in the following terms:

> God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able.

> If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble and, therefore, not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?[7]

This formulation is remarkably clear and succinct. Unfortunately, Greek responses were not. There were, at least, two reasons for this: first, Greek thought was based on a polytheistic system that split the concept of evil across many figures that were either in conflict or existed harmoniously depending on the myth.[8] Second, while recognising that it was a significant problem, the Greeks held that, ultimately, evil could not be solved through human reason; it simply had to be accepted as being either inherent in the cosmos or a consequence of the will of the Gods. The Greeks recognised that evil was a problem and held that it was split between competing Gods, but gave up trying to rationally understand or explain why this is the case. Doing so would require knowing the will of the Gods, a futile endeavour grounded in hubris and likely to be punished by those same Gods. As a consequence, the Greeks rationalised the problem, but not the answer, which was still thought from myth. Rather than try to know the will of the Gods, the Greeks tended to focus on how to satisfy them. Justice, not evil, was the motivating concern. It is only with the movement from polytheism to monotheism that the problem of evil becomes explicit and occupies centre stage in philosophical (and theological) debate.

By bringing the question of evil to the fore and treating it as a serious philosophical question requiring rational answers, monotheism generated a host of questions not previously asked, including: what is evil? Where is evil located? Does God permit evil? If He does, why? And, if He does not, what does this mean for God's infinite power and glory? Responding to these questions required engagements with fundamental metaphysical questions, including: what role does God play in existence? Is God good? How can God's goodness be reconciled with the existence of evil? And what is God's relationship to evil?

Judaism is historically important to the development of the problem of evil because it first provided thinkers with the conceptual tools to engage with the issue. To understand the narrative role and development of the problem of evil within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, we need then to return to Judaic thinking and the way it conceives and conceptualises evil, the figure of evil, and this figure's role and place in relation to God.

The problem immediately encountered is that the figure that will later become known as Satan is virtually absent from the Old Testament and, when he does appear, he does not play the same role that Satan plays in the New Testament. For example, '[n]owhere in the Old Testament does Satan achieve the status of a dualistic opponent of God who restricts God to serving as the principle of the Good'.[9] This is not only because the Old and New Testaments have different conceptions of God and evil, but also because they view the relationship between the two differently. Whereas Christian thinking tended to perceive evil as being located in a figure external to and hell-bent on the destruction of the Kingdom of Heaven, the Judaic tradition associated evil with something akin to Christian conceptions of individual sin, itself associated with a wandering from the Covenant with God. This wandering could be because of individual choice or because the individual is influenced by a figure, called *the satan*, who exists in Heaven and is sent by God to test individual devotion to Him. In either case, *the individual*, not the satan or, as he will later be known, Satan, is held to be solely responsible for any wandering from the path of God.

To understand this, we need to say something about the metaphysical structure underpinning the Old Testament. Judaic monotheism is structured around a unitary cosmos, headed by the Kingdom of Heaven, wherein God resides surrounded by a hierarchical army of angels. The Judaic figure of evil – the satan – is 'one of God's obedient servants – a messenger, or *angel*, a word that translates the Hebrew term for messenger (*mal'āk*) into Greek (*angelos*)'.[10] The satan is fully conversant with God and, in many cases, a messenger of God. There is no separate realm divorced from God where the satan resides, nor is it the case that the satan is engaged in a battle with God. Rather, this figure fulfils a functionary role: he is God's servant doing God's work.

Supporting this is a particular conception of God. If, as Judaism claims, Yahweh, the god of Israel, is the one God – and, indeed, there is only one God – then that God, as the one God, must create all. While Yahweh is singular, the properties defining Yahweh are not and cannot be. Yahweh must be a complex of opposites, meaning that He must be 'both light and darkness, both good and evil'.[11] The key point here, one that distinguishes the Judaic notion of evil from the narrative of the later Christian notion, is that evil is 'part' of God; it is not something distinct from God, whether thought conceptually or existentially.

The institutionalisation of Abrahamic texts into a coherent religion was underpinned by the belief that when Abraham encountered God, God set forth a number of laws to be followed. God had entered into a Covenant,

or agreement, with the Hebrews whereby He decreed certain laws and the followers were responsible for implementing these decrees. This was not a relationship of equals, but a hierarchical one, in which the human followed God's laws. This did not entail passive participation, but required active involvement as each individual had to take responsibility for himself and his actions. Each was, therefore, placed under an infinite responsibility to ensure that he lived up to the Covenant.

Because the Law covered social, moral, legal, and ritual aspects of life, it was both complex and holistic and so very easy to break. This, in turn, led to the development of conceptual distinctions to determine and delineate if, when, and how any violations took place. For this reason, a whole conceptual apparatus sprung up around violations of the Covenant. Such was the ease with which the Law could be broken that there were 'about thirty words in all to refer to this possibility'.[12] Three of the most important were *ḥṭ*, *psḥ*, and *`awon*.[13]

Ḥṭ means to miss the mark, as in missing a target or falling short of an expectation. Within the boundaries of the Covenant, it was used when the inferior party failed to uphold their duty as described by the Covenant. Thought in terms of contract between humans, this entails one party not fulfilling the obligations it has agreed to. This is bad enough, but becomes exponentially worse when thought in terms of God so that one, for instance, breaches an agreement with God. It is important to note, however, that *ḥṭ* is only a possibility once the Covenant has been given. Prior to the Covenant, there is no Law and, as such, no way to break the Law. There cannot, therefore, be *ḥṭ*.

For this reason, 'evil' or sin marks out not an ontological condition of human beings, but a relationship between humans and God. As such, *ḥṭ* is closely associated with *psḥ*, which, in its general sense, means 'the breaking of a relationship',[14] but can have a stronger sense of rebellious behaviour against the Covenant.The notion of rebelling against the Covenant becomes more prominent as the Judaic figure of *the satan* is transformed into the Christian figure of *Satan*: a being who is in open rebellion against God. Both *ḥṭ* and *psḥ* are also intimately connected to the third word associated with evil, *`awon*, meaning 'crooked, twisted or wrong',[15] as in travelling down the wrong path away from God.

Crucially, Judaic thought insisted on a direct relationship between the individual and God and, for this reason, held that any departure from the Covenant was the responsibility of humans alone. Evil was thought in terms of an immediate relationship to God where the human failed in some way to adhere to the path set out by God. Even the interjections of the satan do not

break this immediate relationship because the role of the satan is to oppose God *to do the work of God*. Evil arises if the individual is seduced by the satan and so chooses to abandon the Covenant with God. The satan does not have dominion over humans nor does he aim to seduce them for his own ends, but tests them to determine individual devotion to God.

This is significant because it means that the satan does not challenge God's authority to establish alternative truths, but is used by God to test the individual's faith in God; a challenge or opposition that is always aimed at the affirmation of God. Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of this is

> found in the book of Job (written about 400 BC), [where] the Satan [*sic*], or the Accuser, is one of the sons of God whose duty it is to test a person's faithfulness to God. Hence God gives the Satan [*sic*] permission to test Job to find out whether Job's dutifulness to God is simply a sham or whether it is sincere.[16]

For this reason, the Hebrews thought of the satan 'as an obstructor',[17] someone who played an accusatory role that tested (1) God by asking Him questions in the Heavenly court, a questioning that was, however, always deferential to God, or (2) humans as they tried to fulfil the Covenant with God.

This, however, led to a number of questions, including: if God is omnipotent and all-knowing and so knows an individual's commitment to the Covenant, why is the figure of the satan needed to test and determine this commitment? Does God's introduction of the figure of the satan mean that God is not the all-powerful, all-knowing deity worshipped? And why would an all-powerful, all-knowing God permit humanity to sin? Responses given to these questions led to substantial changes in early Hebrewic thinking, so that 'by the time we reach the New Testament, the adversary has become entirely separate from Yahweh, an independent threat for the faithful to beware'.[18]

From a Strict Monotheism to an Implicit Metaphysical Dualism

There were historical and conceptual reasons for this alteration. Jewish thought did not develop in a vacuum, but was a movement conditioned by the society it was located in. Alterations in Hebrew thought must be seen in light of these social alterations and, in particular, the struggles over meanings, doctrines, and interpretations that result from any community's attempt to define itself.

The Hebrew community, like all communities, was, therefore, constituted by differences in opinion. The dominant group thought of itself as adhering to the true Covenant with God. It understood that it was representing God's message whereas the others were violating this Covenant and so were sinners. Sin (= evil) gradually became associated with those who had departed from the 'true' meaning of the Covenant. Designations of truth and evil became determined by power relations between social groups. Outsider groups had to be guarded against because they threatened the righteousness of those who did adhere to the Covenant. For this reason, 'stories of Satan and other fallen angels proliferated in these troubled times, especially within those radical groups that had turned against the rest of the Jewish community and, consequently, concluded that others had turned against them – or (as they put it) against G*od*'.[19]

The strife that the Hebrew community (understood as a whole) experienced became manifested in its conceptual understanding: First, the dominant aspect of the Hebrew community (= good) found itself opposed to an outsider group that challenged and so threatened its doctrine. Through its departure from the Covenant (as understood by the dominant aspect of the Hebrew community), this outsider group became associated with sin (= evil). Second, the social splitting of the Hebrew community led to a conceptual splitting of God, who was divided between a 'good' aspect and a 'bad' aspect. Once this occurred, God was understood to be defined by the former alone, with the latter existing independently of Him. Third, Hebrew thought developed a 'combat myth'[20] whereby God (= authentic Hebrew community) was thought to be besieged and so in combat with evil (= outsiders). In combination, the conceptual schema of the Hebrews underwent a gradual, profound change. Rather than a unitary God defined by a complex of opposites, the oppositions that were 'in' God were split, with one side held to exist 'outside' of God. God was associated with the 'good' aspect while the 'bad' aspect was held to be external and opposed to Him. This is not a peaceful relationship, but a combative one where each side fights for supremacy.

Importantly, the monotheistic principles of Judaism meant that these changes did not result in a straightforward dualism. The evil principle was still held to be subordinate to God. How to account for this brought about the alterations in the understanding of the satan, including his role and relationship to God, that mark late Judaic thinking, the debates of the inter-Testament years, and latterly Christian thinking. As Jeffrey Alexander explains, the notion of an evil principle separate from God became even more widespread and powerful as Christianity developed, for the simple reason that the early Christian sects saw in it 'the possibility of attributing

evil to forces outside their own cultural system. The Christian devil was a means of separating the "good religion" of Jesus from the evil (primarily Jewish) forces from which it had emerged.'[21]

As a consequence, John Sanford argues that 'what we find . . . in the New Testament, is that there is not one point of view about evil, its origins, and its place in the Divine Economy, but two points of view'.[22] The first is a monistic view of evil that holds that it is only from the perspective of humans that evil appears as something negative. In an argument that will underpin Leibniz's theodicy, what appears to humans to be evil is, in actuality, part of God's overall plan. 'From this point of view it would seem as though God *allows* evil to operate, evidently because evil plays some kind of essential role in the Divine Economy.'[23] What appears to be evil is, in reality, a necessary aspect that adheres to and enhances God's divine plan.

The second view entails 'an outright Dualism in which Satan and evil play no part at all in the Divine Economy'.[24] God is synonymous with the good, Satan is synonymous with evil. Sanford argues that, despite Christianity's monotheism, it was this second view that became dominant, with the consequence that it 'has been more characteristic of the general attitude of the Church throughout the centuries than the first'.[25] It is for this reason that Christianity tends to hold that God is not responsible for evil: 'the instigator of evil [is] a malignant spirit whose power to offend [is] far greater than that of mere mortals'.[26]

To allow this to happen, a twinning had to occur 'in the divine nature, similar to the twinning in the God of Egypt or of Canaan. The one God split into two parts. One, the good aspect of the God, became "the Lord." The other, the evil aspect, became "the Devil".'[27] As a consequence, the early Christians were caught in a bind of their own making. 'At the same time [as they] continued to insist upon monotheism as the essential element of their religion, they moved unconsciously toward dualism.'[28] The figure of *the satan* was no longer thought to be the servant of God in Heaven, but became *Satan*, the personification of evil, who, like the radical Hebrew groups, was cast out of Heaven to exist in opposition to it.[29]

This movement towards dualism meant that, from the third century BC, evil became increasingly associated with a being distinct from God. In turn, this resulted in a number of alterations taking place in the conception of God, the human relationship to God, and the nature and place of evil in the cosmos. Evil was no longer thought to be part of God, but was divorced from Him. God was then no longer taken to be a complex of opposites, but a being thought in terms of pure goodness.

It will be remembered that, initially, evil was understood in terms of

an immanent relationship between humans and God in which the former upheld the Covenant with the latter. Evil was synonymous with the human choosing to wander from God's path, whether this was because of his own autonomous choice or because he listened to the satan. In either case, however, the individual human was held responsible for his actions. Indeed, the actions of the satan are not those of a malicious independent being, but entail the word of God which is used to test an individual's devotion to Him.

This changed with the rise of Satan. Not only was Satan thought to be independent of God, he was understood to have his own agenda diametrically opposed to God. Rather than one God challenging humans through a third figure loyal to God, there are now two cosmic forces – God and Satan – competing for the human, who is capable of choosing either. Good arises when individuals work with God, evil results when individuals turn to Satan. Christian thinking comes, therefore, to understand that, if the individual follows God, this is due to an action of the individual and God; if the individual chooses evil, this is a consequence of individual choice and Satanic action.

By splitting evil from God in this way, Christians secured God's goodness. They did so, however, by appearing to sacrifice His omnipotence and, by extension, the monotheistic principles that Christianity was based on. After all, God, as pure goodness, now found Himself confronted by pure evil in the figure of Satan; a figure that He does not appear to be able to overcome even though His omnipotence should easily allow it. Overcoming evil while respecting the tenets of Christianity required that God be shown to be supremely good *and* omnipotent. These characteristics are difficult to combine. It is, for example, easy to account for evil by recognising that God is singular and all-powerful, but not good. We just have to accept that God can do anything, including evil actions. Alternatively, God can be thought to be good but not all-powerful by positing the existence of another being responsible for evil. This, however, undermines God's omnipotence. If God's goodness, omnipotence, and omniscience were to be reconciled, it required significant conceptual innovation and subtlety.

This took time, but eventually early Christian thinking resolved the dilemma by 'implicitly and unconsciously separat[ing] the evil side of the God from the good side, calling the good side the Lord and the evil side the Devil'.[30] As noted, this did not entail a straightforward dualism. The Devil was left in an

> anomalous position. On the one hand he was the author of evil, and his existence relieved the Lord of direct responsibility for many of the evils

> of the world. On the other hand, he was not an independent principle but the creature and even the servant of the Lord. This anomaly led to an implicit tension between monism and dualism. The Devil, who was not prominent in the Old Testament, gained stature in the Apocryphal, Apocalyptic, and New Testament literatures. Far from being a mere accretion of peripheral superstitions, the Devil has his genesis in . . . God himself. He is a counterpart, a doublet of the good Lord. He is the shadow of God.[31]

The figure of the satan moved from being a loyal functionary of God who resides in God's court to an independent entity that not only exists outside of His court, but actively tries to undermine God for alternative (evil) ends. Satan's expulsion from God's court takes place through two means, depending on whether it refers to the rank of angels, known as the *bene ha-elohim*, or God's representative on Earth, known as the *mal'ak Yahweh*.

The *bene ha-elohim* were angels who were, initially, part of the Heavenly court. Some of them, however, sinned, which led to their exit from Heaven. How they descended depended on their crimes. If members of the *bene ha-elohim* experienced pride, and so, for example, no longer served God but themselves, they were 'cast down from heaven'.[32] If, however, they were lustful, they initially descended voluntarily towards the flesh they desired before being 'cast down into the pit as punishment for their sins'.[33] In either case, the *bene ha-elohim* fell from Heaven, a fall that, because it affected a split in the Heavenly court, was important for the development of evil as a separate cosmic force to God.

However, the decisive event in the creation of Satan was the conceptual alteration that the *mal'ak Yahweh* underwent. It is with this movement that the fundamental changes from the Hebrew conception of the satan to the Christian notion of Satan take place.

> The *mal'ak Yahweh* is the emissary or messenger of the God. Like the *bene ha-elohim*, the *mal'ak* is an aspect of the divine nature. But he differs from the *banim* in one important respect: they remain in heaven with the God, but the *mal'ak* roams the world in his service. The *mal'ak* is the voice of the God, the spirit of the God, the God himself.[34]

Due to the modifications that took place in early Hebrew thinking as a consequence of the split in the historical Hebrew community and the conceptual questions that resulted from its monotheism, the figure of the *mal'ak* gradually changed. Rather than being the voice of God, the *mal'ak* first

'obtain[ed] its independence from Yahweh',[35] before, second, 'its destructive aspect was emphasised',[36] leading to it 'finally . . . becoming the personification of the shadow of the Lord, of the dark side of the divine nature'.[37] Only then did the *mal'ak* become 'the evil angel, Satan, the obstructor, the liar, the destroying spirit'.[38] It is at this point that *the satan* turns into *Satan*, an independent being defined by pure evil who is not only opposed to God, but also engaged in an adversarial battle with Him to overcome God's goodness and instantiate a reign of pure evil.

This conceptual alteration was substantial, but it seemed to pose two conceptions of God and two conceptions of evil: one from the Old Testament and one from the New. It was not, therefore, sufficient to simply develop a new cosmic narrative that sees God opposed to Satan. The monotheistic premises of the Judaeo-Christian tradition meant that the Old and New Testaments had to be reconciled. To do so, prior doctrine was gradually read in light of the conceptual apparatus of the New Testament. As such, Christian thought undertook a re-reading of the Old Testament to account for the horrors that were previously understood to be inflicted on humans by God to, instead, ascribe them to Satan. For this reason, we find that

> Chronicles [a late book of the Hebrew Bible] . . . protects God by attributing to Satan what God did in [the earlier book] Samuel. In the same way, we learn from [the Book of] *Jubilees* that the less savoury acts attributed to Yahweh in the Torah – for example, the demand for the sacrifice of Isaac and the attempt to kill Moses – were in fact prompted by the prince of the hostile angels, whose name in *Jubilees* is usually 'Mastema'.[39]

The introduction of the name 'Mastema' is crucial to the development of the figure of Satan because, with it, the figure of evil is, for the first time, explicitly associated with hatred and enmity. The reason behind this is relatively simple: while 'Mastema' 'is etymologically linked to *śāṭān*'[40] and, as such, carries the adversarial or oppositional connotations that define the figure of the satan in the Old Testament, it is explicitly linked to 'enmity' itself.[41] Whereas the figure of the satan was one of God's angels who acted in God's service, the conceptual relationship that this figure has to God gradually changed until, with the Fall, there arose the figure of Satan, who is not only defined by hatred, but actively 'stands in open rebellion against God'.[42] A cosmic battle was understood to be under way between the forces of good and those of evil, with humans caught between them.

The New Testament and the Problem of Evil

The notion and figure of evil are, therefore, fundamentally different in the New Testament and in the Old. Evil is no longer thought in terms of individual sin, nor is it simply tied to the God–human relationship. Evil is divorced from sin, thought of on its own terms as something far stronger, extensive, and dangerous, and is located in the figure of Satan, who is understood to be the personification of evil. In many respects, the New Testament is wholly concerned with the battle against Satan and the overcoming of evil. Although Satan 'seldom appears onstage in these gospel accounts, [he] nevertheless plays a central role in the divine drama [because the story told] would make little sense *without* Satan'.[43] After all,

> the function of the Devil in the New Testament is as counterprinciple to Christ. The central message of the New Testament is salvation: Christ saves us. What he saves us from is the evil power of the Devil. If the power of the Devil is dismissed, the Christ's saving mission becomes meaningless. The Devil occupies a central position in the New Testament as the chief enemy of the Lord.[44]

Without a figure of pure evil, it is not possible to develop a narrative that sees the son of God as being persecuted, let alone executed, by mere mortals who have been led astray by another figure. Similarly, the apocalyptic narrative makes little sense unless God, in his all-powerfulness, returns to overcome this alternative figure. When and how this return will take place are much debated in theological discussions, but the point is that the Christian narrative is developed from a subtly, but nevertheless significantly, different understanding of the cosmos from that found in Judaic thought. Rather than being the main players seeking to fulfil the Covenant with God, humans are bit-part players in the ongoing cosmic battle between good and evil, God and Satan.

A number of immediate consequences result from this: first, the battle for the souls of humans is based no longer on their actions alone, but on how successful the figure of evil is in corrupting them. Evil does not result from the individual simply failing to live up to the norms of the Covenant with God, but is thought in terms of an external source. Blame is placed not solely on individuals, but on the corrupting figure of evil. Second, the God of the New Testament is, in many respects, conceptually kinder. He is no longer a complex of opposites, but is associated with pure goodness. Third, there is an often unacknowledged, but very pertinent, splitting of the properties

attributed to God. While there is only one God, evil does not emanate from God, nor is it God's responsibility; rather, evil is caused by another being, Satan, who somehow exists independently from God and is able to challenge God's supremacy. As a consequence, there is, fourth, a deep sense of metaphysical crisis underpinning the traditional Christian narrative wherein God is not alone in the cosmos, but is challenged by a usurper: the Prince of darkness, the personification of evil, the corruptor of souls, Satan. This split leads to, fifth, an uneasy tension between the ideas that God is, on the one hand, the omnipotent, all-knowing, supremely good foundation of existence, but yet, on the other hand, somehow not responsible for evil. As noted, Christianity responded by establishing an implicit dualism between an omnipotent, all-knowing God and an evil cosmic being responsible for evil, but this brought forth a number of conceptual problems and questions that would occupy it for much of its history.

Concluding Remarks

Among the many questions that arose, arguably the most important relate to the source or genesis of this division, centred on the question: where does this evil being emanate from? Two options appear to present themselves: (1) evil comes from God, but is subsequently independent of and somehow subservient to God; or (2) a straightforward metaphysical dualism is established so that evil is, from the beginning, located in a figure other than God. The first option leads to questions such as: how and why did God create evil? How can evil be subservient to God and yet challenge God? And how can it be independent of God if God is omnipotent? The second option accounts for these, but contradicts the monotheistic principles that the Judaeo-Christian tradition affirms.[45] The question arose as to whether it was possible to find a third option, one that remained true to monotheistic principles, held that God is omnipotent and all-knowing, and separated evil from God to secure God's goodness.

Christian thinkers initially took up this challenge by turning to Scripture. They found, however, that it is full of contradictions. For example, 'several different interpretations of the fall of Satan and his fellow angels have at one time or another been put forward depending on whether it is viewed as (1) a moral lapse; (2) a loss of dignity; (3) a literal ejection from heaven; (4) a voluntary departure from heaven'.[46] There are also scriptural inconsistencies over the geography of the fall depending on whether it entails a fall '(1) from heaven to earth; (2) from heaven into the underworld; or (3) from earth (or air) into the underworld',[47] and, indeed, over the chronology of

the fall depending on whether it was thought to occur '(1) at the beginning of the world before the fall of Adam; (2) from envy of Adam; (3) with the Watchers about the time of Noah; (4) at the advent of Christ; (5) at the Passion of Christ; (6) at the second coming of Christ; (7) a thousand years after the second coming'.[48]

In turn, this created significant differences in terms of when and how the oppositional relationship between God and Satan arose. For example, accounts in the New Testament differ in terms of whether

> (1) At the beginning of the world there was war in heaven . . . (2) The angels fell long after Adam . . . (3) The Kingdom of God arrive[d] on earth with the advent of Christ . . . (4) The Kingdom of Satan [was] weakened but not finally toppled by the coming of Christ [who] will come again [to destroy Satan] or cast [him] forever into hell . . . (5) at the second coming, Christ will bind Satan for a thousand years . . . at the end of [which] he will issue forth to harm [Satan] one final time [before] finally [destroying him].[49]

If Scripture could not solve the problem, Christian thinkers came to recognise that *they* would have to. To do so, three logical options presented themselves: (1) simply ignore the problem; (2) turn away from monotheism to a straightforward dualism; or (3) try to reconcile the objective existence of evil with God's omnipotent, omniscient, supreme goodness.

The first option had, to that point, been the dominant one, in so far as Hebrew thought came to implicitly depend upon a metaphysical dualism, with the tensions that this caused for its monotheistic foundations being largely ignored or, if treated, dealt with by simply reaffirming God's omnipotence. This, however, was no longer viable. Not only had the problem become explicit, but Christian thinkers,

> such as Justin and Irenaeus, recognised that when Christianity claimed universality it had to compete intellectually with both rabbinic thought and Greek philosophy. Christians also faced the hostility of the Roman [S]tate and of the established Roman pagan religion (which was, however, already in deep decline).[50]

Initially, this led to the second option; that is, a turning away from monotheism to a straightforward dualism. It will be remembered that Christian thought *implicitly* made this movement when it thought of evil as being located in a cosmic figure distinct from God, despite its continued explicit

adherence to a strict monotheism. The *implicit* reliance on a metaphysical dualism gradually became *explicit*. This culminated in the rise of Manichaeism in the third century AD, a system that offered a 'straightforward solution for the problem of evil [whereby] God is doing the best he can against evil, but finds himself facing an independent opponent as formidable as he'.[51] Despite, or possibly because of, its simplicity, Manichaeism offered the most extreme and successful challenge to Christianity.

Manichaeism did not, however, go unanswered and, indeed, in many respects, was the stimulus that brought Christian thinkers to develop a robust response to the problem of evil within monotheistic parameters. Rather than ignore the problem of evil or have recourse to a metaphysical dualism, Christian thinkers became increasingly creative in their attempts to reconcile the objective existence of evil with the central tenets of monotheism; that is, a singular God who is omnipotent, all-knowing, and supremely good.

Logically, four options were open: '(1) God is neither all-good nor all-powerful (an option usually excluded on the grounds that no one would call this God); (2) God is all-good but not all-powerful; (3) God is all-powerful but not all-good; (4) God is both all-good and all-powerful'.[52] The last option was adopted by Judaeo-Christian thinkers, but, as previously mentioned, is particularly difficult to defend because it requires the reconciliation of the all-goodness and all-powerfulness of God with the existence of evil, something that seems to call into question both. After all

> if God is all powerful, He has it in His power to prevent the existence of Satan (and evil human beings like him) from the outset. Evil people, and evil spirits, Satan chief amongst them perhaps, exist only because He permits them to. If God is creator and Satan really does exist, then God is responsible for Satan's creation also. By tradition, of course, Satan is not created as an evil spirit; on the contrary, he is a fallen angel. But even this does not appear to let God off the hook. If He is omniscient then He could foretell Satan's future conduct, and must accordingly have permitted it.[53]

This issue only grew in significance as a result of the social alterations taking place in the third to fifth centuries. The most notable, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, was particularly problematic because the Empire had recently (AD 380) converted to Christianity. This led some to question how the Roman Empire, supposedly under God's protection by virtue of representing Him on Earth, could fall. It appeared that there existed another cosmic force in contradistinction to God, one that seemed to be winning.

The threat posed by these historical and conceptual challenges meant that Christian thinkers became increasingly frantic in their efforts to develop conceptual resources to explain both. The most influential of these thinkers was Augustine of Hippo (354–430), who proposed a theologically inspired account of evil that was hugely influential for the development of Christianity, for theological attempts to reconcile an all-powerful God with the existence of evil generally, and, indeed, for subsequent non-theological attempts to understand evil.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the rise of monotheism, see Thomas Römer, *L'Invention de Dieu* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2014).
2. The Judaeo-Christian tradition is also, obviously, intimately linked to Islam and so we would, ideally, also explore the conceptions of evil at play in Islam; a topic that has received relatively little attention. However, because Western *philosophical* thinking on the topic develops from the Judaeo-Christian trajectory, this chapter focuses on the way 'evil' is thought in these traditions, paying particular attention to the alterations that occur as Christianity arises from Judaism. For a discussion of evil in Islam, see Adnan Aslam, 'The Fall and Overcoming of Evil and Suffering in Islam', in *The Origin and the Overcoming of Evil and Suffering in the World Religions*, ed. Peter Koslowski (Dordecht: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 24–47.
3. Throughout, the term 'Hebrewic' will refer to the general community from which Jewish and latterly Christian thinking emerged. It is not meant to indicate that there was ever a strict homogeneity to the Hebrewic community, but simply provides a narrative tool to outline the alterations in thinking that led to the Jewish and Christian conceptions of evil.
4. Satan has, of course, gone by many names throughout history, including the Devil, Lucifer, Mephistopheles, Mastema, Azazel, Sammael, Semyaza, and Belial, to name but a few of the more dominant ones. These names delineate not so much different beings as different nomenclatures for the same principle. As Jeffrey Burton Russell explains, 'the victory of "Satan" over "Azazel" or "Belial" is less the victory of one kind of *being* over another than the victory of one *name* over the others. Satan, Azazel, Belial, and Mastema were none of them in their origins a principle of evil, but in the Apocalyptic literature they converge in that direction. What is important is the development of the *concept* of the principle of evil, with which the name of Satan was linked more closely than any other' (*The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977], p. 189).
5. This chapter is predominantly based on material from Neil Forsyth, *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1987); Elaine Pagels, *The Origin of Satan* (London: Penguin, 1995); Russell, *The Devil*; Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Donald Taylor, 'Theological Thoughts about Evil', in *The Anthropology of Evil*, ed. David Parkin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 26–41.

6. Russell, *The Devil*, p. 122. Although it does not much discuss evil, the classic account of Greek religion is Walter Burkert's *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1977).
7. Cited in Neil Forsyth, 'The Origin of "Evil": Classical or Judeo-Christian?', *Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness*, 1:1, January, 2002, pp. 17–52 (p. 20).
8. For example, Atë was associated with evil and misfortune, Eris was responsible for discord and strife, and the Keres were destructive or malevolent female spirits of the dead.
9. Hans Schwarz, *Evil: A Historical and Theoretical Perspective*, trans. Mark W. Worthing (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 61–2.
10. Pagels, *The Origin of Satan*, p. 39.
11. Russell, *The Devil*, pp. 177–8.
12. Taylor, 'Theological Thoughts about Evil', p. 28.
13. Ibid. p. 28.
14. Ibid. p. 29.
15. Ibid. p. 29.
16. Ibid. p. 34.
17. Ibid. p. 34.
18. Forsyth, *The Combat Myth*, p. 122.
19. Pagels, *The Origin of Satan*, p. 49.
20. Forsyth, *The Combat Myth*, pp. 298–9.
21. Jeffrey C. Alexander, 'Toward a Sociology of Evil: Getting beyond Modernist Common Sense about the Alternative to "the Good,"' p. 159, in *Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Maria Pia Lara (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 153–72.
22. John Sanford, *Evil: The Shadow Side of Reality* (New York: Crossroads, 1981), p. 43.
23. Ibid. p. 39.
24. Ibid. p. 43.
25. Ibid. p. 43.
26. Russell, *The Devil*, p. 183.
27. Ibid. p. 183.
28. Ibid. p. 183.
29. For a more detailed discussion on how these occurrences contributed to the development of the Jesus movement and, by extension, the relationship between Judaism – manifested in Judaic apocalyptic literature – and Christianity, see Forsyth, 'The Origin of "Evil"', pp. 29–32.
30. Russell, *The Devil*, p. 251.

31. Ibid. p. 251.
32. Ibid. p. 197.
33. Ibid. p. 197.
34. Ibid. pp. 197–8. *Banim* literally means 'sons', which, in the context of this quotation, refers to the 'sons of heaven' or, more generally, 'heavenly angels', as opposed to the *mal'ak*, who is an angel that roams the Earth in the service of God.
35. Ibid. p. 203.
36. Ibid. p. 203.
37. Ibid. p. 203.
38. Ibid. p. 203.
39. Ibid. p. 182. The Book of Jubilees, also known as the Lesser Genesis, is a work of Jewish origins written around the second century BC that records an account of the Biblical history of the world from the creation to Moses. Its theological status, especially within Christianity, is controversial: the Ethiopic Church accepts the book as Scripture, while the Roman, Orthodox, and Protestant churches reject it. For a discussion of its content and status, see James C. Vanderkam, *Book of Jubilees* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001).
40. Ibid. p. 188.
41. Ibid. p. 188.
42. Pagels, *The Origin of Satan*, p. xvii.
43. Ibid. p. 12.
44. Russell, *The Devil*, pp. 229–30.
45. Russell, *Satan*, p. 25.
46. Russell, *The Devil*, p. 241.
47. Ibid. p. 241.
48. Ibid. pp. 241–2.
49. Ibid. pp. 242–3.
50. Russell, *Satan*, p. 51.
51. William E. Mann, 'Augustine on Evil and Original Sin', p. 40, in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 40–8.
52. Russell, *Satan*, p. 17.
53. Gordon Graham, *Evil and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 198–9.